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issues. For example, it may be seen that the royalty issue (issue A)
in each case does not fully correspond. Although the parties and the
causes-the legal theories asserted in the case-are identical, the
wells (elements necessary to the object of each suit) from which the
royalties are demanded are not the same since they were drilled
pursuant to different leases. Therefore, article 2286 cannot apply to
preclude relitigation of issue A. Similarly, in issues B and D, the
parties and causes are identical; however, since each case deals with
different wells, the objects of the demands are not the same. In
California Co. I, the two litigants are demanding that the court
recognize as valid leases executed by them before 1951; in California
Co. II, the parties are demanding that the court recognize as valid
leases executed by them after that date.
However, it is evident that issue C is the same in both cases.
The three identities match perfectly because the land involved is
the same. If the court finds that this issue was necessarily decided
in the first case (as it was, since one cannot grant a lease on proper
ty one does not own), it should be considered an object of the judgment; and, as such, further consideration of the issue is precluded.
The purpose of the triple identity of article 2286, to ensure that the
issues are indeed the same, is satisfied. The conclusion is that after
the original decision, the Price-Beckwith group had every reason to
believe it had the authority necessary to execute leases on the
disputed property.
Since the Welch opinion is, for the most part, carefully couched
in terms such as "common law" collateral estoppel, it need not be
wholly repudiated in order to adopt the civilian method of issue
preclusion. A broadened understanding and application of the terms
"authority of the thing adjudged" and "object of the judgment"
is
all that is necessary. Such an approach would save valuable court
time, maintain the integrity of the prior judgment, and promote certainty for the parties.
Dennis K. Dolbear

INSANITY, INTENT, AND HOMEOWNER'S LIABILITY

The husband, defendant's insured, fatally shot his wife and committed suicide. The wife's parents brought a direct action against
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the defendant-insurer for their daughter's wrongful death,1 basing
their claim on a homeowner's insurance policy issued to the husband. The policy excluded coverage for bodily injury "expected or
intended from the standpoint of the insured."' The trial court found
that the wife had survived her husband for a short interval3 and
that the husband was insane at the time of the incident. However,
the trial court held that the exclusionary clause in the insurance
policy precluded the insurer's liability.' Although observing no
manifest error in the trial court's findings of fact, the First Circuit
Court of Appeal reversed and held that the insanity of the insured
prevented him from having the requisite intent to inflict injury
necessary to exclude coverage under the provisions of the
homeowner's policy. Thus, the defendant-insurer was cast in liability
for the wife's wrongful death. von Dameck v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance, 361 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code imposes civil liability on
persons who, by their conduct and through their own fault, cause
1. The wife's siblings, who had joined with her parents as plaintiffs, were
dismissed from the suit on defendant's exception of no cause or right of action. The
provisions of article 2315 of the Civil Code appear to create a cause of action as well as
a right of action by the same language. Johnson, Death on the Callais Coach: The
Mystery of Wrongful Death and Survival Actions in Louisiana, 37 LA. L. REv. 1, 7-8
(1975). The siblings were excluded from pursuing a wrongful death action by the
presence of the parents in the second class of stipulated beneficiaries. LA. CIv. CODE
art. 2315. Thus, they lacked a cause of action as well as a right of action.
2. von Dameck v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 361 So. 2d 283, 288 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 794, 802 (La. 1978).
3. The chronology of the murder-suicide was determinative of the parents' cause
and right of action: had the wife predeceased her husband, the wrongful death action
would have inured to the benefit of the husband in the first class of stipulated
beneficiaries, thereby excluding the parents of the wife. The question of the wife's survival was resolved on the evidence alone-no presumptions of survivorship were applied. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 936-39.
In this context, it is interesting to note that the cause of action for the wrongful
death arose after the death of the tortfeasor, since the husband predeceased his wife.
There is some question whether an insurer can be held liable on a cause of action that
arises after the death of its insured. Article 734 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a succession representative may be made a defendant in an action to enforce
an obligation of the deceased. This provision might be analogized to the facts of the instant case. It might also be argued that the cause of action for a wrongful death may
arise before the death itself-for example, when an event occurs which makes death
inevitable.
4. The trial court reasoned that if the insured was sane, his act was intentional;
if he was insane, he could not be held liable "ipso facto making his insurer immune."
361 So. 2d at 286. As an additional reason for his judgment, the trial judge stated that
the insured "intended to shoot and kill his wife" despite his psychotic condition. Id.
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damage to another.' Because the term fault encompasses acts of intentional wrongdoing as well as acts of negligence, civil liability for
intentional torts flows from article 2315. The development and application of the concept of intent, however, appears to be a creature
of jurisprudence and common sense.' The concept of intent, in the
context of a civil suit for damages, provokes two questions: (1) What
is meant by "intent" for purposes of delictual liability; and (2) Does
"intent" take on a different meaning when one is construing the
terms of an insurance contract?
The conscious volition to perform an act does not necessarily
constitute intent in the law of torts. The traditional view of intent
requires that the actor have some comprehension of the nature and
consequences of his act. The notion of intent requires more than the
mere desire to perform a given act; it also encompasses the actor's
state of mind with regard to the consequences.' For the act to be
considered intentional, however, the actor need not actually contemplate the specific consequences which follow his action; it is sufficient if the particular result which does occur was "substantially
certain" to follow from the act." Obviously, a judge cannot be certain
of an actor's mental state at the time an act was performed. Even
less certainty exists when the actor is dead or otherwise unavailable
to the court. For this reason, the finding of intent is often supplied
by means of a presumption of law9 or through an inference drawn
from the particular facts of a case."0 In practical application, the
5. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 states in part: "Every act whatever of man that
causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
6. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 31 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
7. Bourque v. Duplechin, 331 So. 2d 40 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Soileau v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 198 So. 2d 543 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
8. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 32; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
See Spivey v. Battaglia, 258 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1972) (plaintiff suffered facial paralysis
after defendant hugged her); Terito v. McAndrew, 246 So. 2d 235 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1971) (defendant, who claimed intoxication, hit plaintiff solely to "shut his mouth," but
plaintiff's knee was fractured).
9. In von Dameck, the court said: "The trial judge's conclusion was based, in
part, also upon the presumption that all persons intend the natural and probable consequences of their acts. Presumptions are consequences which the law or the judge
draws from a known fact to a fact unknown." 361 So. 2d at 288-89. See also Home Ins.
Co. v. Neilsen, 165 Ind. App. 445, 332 N.E.2d 240 (1975).
10. In Wildblood v. Continental Casualty Co., 182 La. 202, 161 So. 584 (1935), an
essential claim of plaintiff's case was that the decedent had been killed by mistake.
Since the killer was unknown, the court declared that "from the nature of the case, the
fact [of intent to murder another] can be found only by a search for circumstances, and
a consideration of inferences drawn from them; for guilt has sealed the lips of the
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standard used is whether a reasonable man, in the same circumstances as the actor, would have been substantially certain that
a given consequence would follow from the act." By using this standard, the court is able to infer intent on the basis of probabilities
rather than conjectures; however, the standard is appropriate only
if the actor can be presumed to be a reasonable man.
The finding of intent by means of a presumption or inference
permits a conclusion to be reached as to an actor's probable state of
mind, and appears to have application to both delictual and contractual liability. However, the clause in insurance contracts excluding
coverage for intended acts has been said to owe its origin to insurance underwriters' "deference to public policy."" The clause
prevents civil liability for intentional acts from being shifted to the
insurance enterprise; instead, it remains with the individual actor.
Even if such a provision was not expressed in an insurance policy,
its exclusionary effect would be produced by operation of law."
Public policy opposes indemnifying a tortfeasor against damages
which he intentionally inflicts since to do so would insulate the
deliberate wrongdoer from financial responsibility for his acts, thus
permitting him to act with relative impunity." At the least, an insurance policy which provides liability coverage for damages
resulting from the intentional acts of the insured would do little to
discourage wrongful conduct; at the worst, it would allow a person
planning mischief to purchase financial protection in advance. '5 The
clause excluding coverage for intended acts is also designed to protect the insurance company from being defrauded by its customers."
Thus, the intent referred to in terms of insurance liability may be
said to involve more elements than the probable state of mind of an
assassin and death the lips of his victim." 182 La. at 205, 161 So. at 585. See also
Douglas Public Serv. Corp. v. Leon, 196 La. 735, 200 So. 21 (1941); State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co. v. Treas, 254 Md. 615, 255 A.2d 296 (1969).
11. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 32.
12. Jernigan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 272 F.2d 857, 858 (5th Cir. 1959); Western Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. Aponaug Mfg. Co., 197 F.2d 673, 674 (5th Cir. 1952).
13. Burt v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 187 U.S. 362 (1902); R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT
ON INSURANCE LAW 292 (1971).
14. John Hancock Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. Tarrance, 244 F.2d 86 (6th Cir. 1962);
Morgan v. Greater N.Y. Taxpayers Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 104 N.Y.S.2d 876, 112 N.E.2d 273
(1953); Haser v. Maryland Cas. Co., 78 N.D. 893, 53 N.W.2d 508 (1952); Isenhart v.
General Cas. Co. of America, 233 Or. 49, 377 P.2d 26 (1962).
15. Jernigan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 272 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1959); Home Ins. Co. v.
Neilson, 165 Ind. App. 445, 333 N.E.2d 240 (1975); Brasseaux v. Girouard, 269 So. 2d
590 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
16. Fidelity-Phenix Fire. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 226 Ala. 226, 146 So. 387 (1933);
Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E.188 (1889).
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actor alone; it also comprises the policy question of whether an act
is one against which society is willing to allow the actor to purchase
protection. While public policy permits individuals to insure against
financial liability resulting from negligence, it forbids such financial
protection for the individual who deliberately commits acts of
reprisal, vengeance, and brutality. The clause in insurance policies
excluding coverage for intentional acts thus involves issues of
wrongfulness and social censure that are not necessarily determinative of the meaning of intent for purposes of tort liability. 1
The judicial inquiry into an actor's intent is further complicated
when the issue of insanity is raised. Although the Civil Code defines
insanity, 8 mental incompetency is most often perceived by the
courts as a question of fact to be determined in accordance with the
purposes for which it is applied. 9 Since insanity is a characterization
of an individual's state of mind, it bears a direct relationship to the
question of intent. However, no legal standard of insanity exists for
the purpose of civil liability, and there are no clear standards for
determining what mental conditions are sufficient to negate intent."
Moreover, insanity must be proved affirmatively, since the law
presumes that all persons are sane.2' Although there is some
authority for the view that an insane person is immune from tort
17. Davidson v. Welch, 270 Cal. App. 2d 220, 75 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1969); Walters v.
American Ins. Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 776, 8 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1960); Morrill v. Gallagher,
370 Mich. 578, 122 N.W.2d 687 (1963); Vermont Mut. Ins. v. Dalzell, 52 Mich. App. 686,
218 N.W.2d 52 (1974). In Dalzell, the insured's son threw a thirty-pound pumpkin over
the side of a highway overpass, shattering the windshield of an oncoming car and injuring the driver. The court found that the boy only intended to frighten the plaintiff,
not injure him.
18. LA. CIV. CODE art. 31 states in part: "Persons of insane mind are those who do
not enjoy the exercise and use of reason, after they have arrived at the age at which
they ought, according to nature, to possess it, whether the defect results from nature
or accident."
19. "The law defines mental incompetence differently for different purposes."
State v. Williams, 346 So. 2d 181, 186 (La. 1977). Mental incompetence is a "conclusion
of fact based upon evidence." Neff v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 347 So. 2d 1228, 1230 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1977).
20. In Brasseaux v. Girouard,269 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972), the defendant shot the plaintiff, allegedly in self-defense. The court first ruled that plaintiff's action was negligent, not intentional, because he had unreasonably evaluated the need
for action. On rehearing the court reversed itself. In Areaux v. Maenza, 188 So. 2d 633,
635 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), the defendant claimed that his intoxication prevented him
from having intent. The court disagreed, stating that the defendant was not too drunk
to "know what he was doing."
21. Kalpakis v. Kalpakis, 221 La. 739, 60 So. 2d 217 (1952); Succession of Jones,
120 La. 986, 45 So. 965 (1907); Succession of Vicknair, 126 So. 2d 680 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1961).
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liability in Louisiana,22 the use of insanity as a defense to civil liability
is personal to the tortfeasor.23 Personal defenses may not be urged
by an insurer;24 this rule of law is founded upon provisions of the
Civil Code dealing with suretyship.25
In the instant case, the court characterized the mental condition
of the insured as insanity.26 Expert witnesses classified the insured
as a "paranoid psychotic," capable of functioning normally under
most circumstances, yet incapable of acting rationally when subjected to certain stresses."7 Although the acts of the insured were
performed in a voluntary, purposeful way, the court determined that
the insured did not have the capacity to think in a rational manner
nor to understand the nature of his actions at the time he killed his
wife.2 ' Thus, the court ruled that, although the insured "may have
22. Louisiana is the only state to have held that uninterdicted insane persons are
not liable for their torts. Yancey v. Maestri, 155 So. 509 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1934). This
case has been declared to be "of doubtful continuing validity" by one dissenting judge.
Guidry v. Toups, 351 So. 2d 1280, 1284 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977) (Ponder, J., dissenting).
However, it has been upheld once. Alexander v. Washington, 274 F.2d 349 (5th Cir.
1960). See also Jernigan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 272 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1959) (Rives, C.J.,
dissenting).
23. "Personal defenses are such as infancy, interdiction, coverture, lunacy,
bankruptcy, and the like." Simmons v. Clark, 64 So. 2d 520, 523 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1953).
24. "[Tihe insurance company has only such defenses in a direct action brought by
the injured party as it would have in an action brought by its insured." Musmeci v.
American Auto Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 496, 500 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). Accord, Edwards
v. Royal Indem. Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935); Simmons v. Clark, 64 So. 2d 520
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1953); Addison v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 64 So. 2d
484 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953).
25. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3060 states: "The surety may oppose to the creditor all the
exceptions belonging to the principal debtor, and which are inherent to the debt; but
he cannot oppose exceptions which are personal to the debtor." The relationship of insurer and insured, however, is not perfectly analogous to a surety and a debtor. "Insurance is not like suretyship, in that an insurer who pays the loss has no recourse
against the insured, as a surety who pays the debt has against the principal debtor."
Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 941, 162 So. 734, 738 (1935). See Stamos v. Standard Acc.
Ins. Co., 119 F. Supp. 245 (W.D. La. 1954); Burke v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co.,
19 So. 2d 647 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944); Slovenko, Suretyship, 39 TUL. L. REV. 427 (1965).
This distinction is not considered critical, for "while an insurance contract is not, in the
strict sense, a contract of suretyship as defined by article 3035 of the Civil Code .... it
nevertheless partakes of the nature of suretyship or guaranty ...." Dumas v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 241 La. 1096, 1i10, 134 So. 2d 45, 50 (1961).
26. 361 So. 2d at 288.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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had the intent to shoot his wife, his insanity prevented him from
having the requisite intent to inflict injury."" The court also noted
that the insurer, by relying solely upon the presumption that "all
persons intend the natural and probable consequences of their
acts,"8 failed to discharge the burden of urging its exclusion, for the
presumption has no application when the actor is insane." The court
skirted the question of whether an insane person can be held liable
for his torts by observing that, even if such a defense existed, it
would not be available to the insurer of an insane tortfeasor 2
The fact that the insured was insane at the time of the slaying
should not resolve the question of whether he had the capacity to
form intent. In determining the issue of intent, the court referred to
Turner v. Bucher," which recognized the difficulty in applying legal
standards designed for normal reasoning persons to those who are
of a tender age or an unsound mind.' Because the insured was a
nondiscerning person, the presumption that his act was intentional
could not be supplied. Despite his insanity, however, the insured
may have known to a substantial certainty that his act would result
in injury to his wife. The circumstances of the case were sufficient
to raise the inference of intent but for one factor: the inference of
intent is determined by standards designed for reasonable men.
Thus, it is misleading to suggest that an insane person cannot entertain intent;85 it is more precise to state that intent cannot be
presumed or inferred when the actor is insane, since the law provides a method for finding intent by means of standards designed
only for reasonable persons." By so holding, the court could then
have followed the approach taken in Nettles v. Evans,"' in which the
insured, after ingesting large quantities of drugs and alcohol, struck
the plaintiff. The defendant-insurer alleged that the injury was caused
intentionally, thus excluding coverage. The court ruled that the
insurer had the burden of proving the applicability of its exclu29. Id.
30. Id. at 288-89.
31. Id at 289.
32. Id.
33. 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975).
34. "[Nlondiscerning persons do not possess the capability of knowing the consequences of their conduct; they lack the moral guilt usually associated with delictual
responsibility and, therefore, they should not be legally liable for acts under an objective standard designed for normal reasoning persons." Id. at 274.
35., W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 1001.
36. But see Wagner v. Colonial Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 380 S.W.2d 224, aff'd 408
S.W.2d 612 (Ky. 1966); Deloache v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 233 S.C. 341, 104 S.E.2d 875
(1958); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. McLaughlin, 380 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. 1964).
37. 303 So. 2d 306 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).

1979]

NOTES

sionary clause by a preponderance of the evidence. 8 Since the
evidence regarding the mental state of the insured was inconclusive,
the insurer was cast in liability. In the instant case, the insurer
relied upon the presumptions that all persons are sane and that they
intend the natural and probable consequences of their acts. Once
these presumptions were rebutted, the insurer could not prove the
applicability of its exclusion by a preponderance of the evidence.
The typical liability insurance policy offers coverage only in
cases in which the insured could be held legally liable. 9 It is axiomatic that tort liability can be imposed only on one of three
theories of recovery: intent, negligence, or liability without
reference to unreasonable conduct." In the instant case, it is unclear
which theory was used to determine whether the insured could have
been held legally liable. It was not possible to ground the action in
negligence, since negligence standards are designed for normal
reasoning persons."' If the action was based on the theory that the
insured committed an intentional tort, the insurer's exclusion might
become operative. And, if liability without fault was to be imposed,
the court would have had to functionally overrule prior
jurisprudence granting tort immunity to the insane."' Without expressly analyzing any of the three theories of recovery, the court apparently proceeded on the notion that the conduct of the insured
belonged in the classification of intentional wrongdoing. However,
the court avoided the insurer's exclusionary clause by holding that
insanity, as a defense to an intentional tort, is personal to the insured.'8 Thus, the abstract theory of recovery which formed the
basis for the insurer's liability was that its insured committed a tort
which would have been considered intentional except for the defense
of insanity, a defense unavailable to the insurer. The court's analysis
of the concept of intent is confusing in that it appears to equate the
presence of insanity with the absence of "requisite intent," while at
the same time distinguishing the intent to perform an act from the
intent to bring about the substantially certain consequences of an
act." The court apparently predicated the insurer's liability on the
38. Id. at 309. See also Briley v. Union Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 246 So. 2d 265 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1971).
39. See generally R. KEETON, supra note 13; R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE (1978).

40. The latter phrase is used in place of the term "liability without fault" which,
in common law jurisdictions, goes under the rubric of "strict liability."
41. See Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975).
42. Yancey v. Maestri, 155 So. 509 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1934).
43. 361 So. 2d at 289.
44. Id. at 288.
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basis of intentional wrongdoing by its insured, but simultaneously
ruled that the damages were not intentional in order to avoid the insurer's exclusionary clause.
Civil liability for the damages resulting from intended acts is
provided for by article 2315 of the Civil Code, which refers to the actor's "fault." In a civilian system, the judgment of "fault" carries
with it the implication that the person so adjudged is capable of
discernment and normal reasoning; nondiscerning persons lack the
moral guilt associated with delictual liability. 5 In this case, had it
been necessary to rule that the insured could have been held liable,
the theory of recovery might well have been that of liability without
reference to unreasonable conduct, imposed so that the innocent victim need not bear his loss without compensation." The insanity of
the insured prevented him from being at fault as that term has been
explained in Turner v. Bucher;'7 thus, any liability that could be imposed upon the insured would be liability without fault, rather than
liability for intentional or negligent wrongdoing. This approach,
while necessitating a shift from prior jurisprudence, would have
allowed the court to avoid the paradoxical result it achieved in finding that the insured committed an intentional tort while determining that his intent was insufficient to trigger the exclusionary clause
of the insurance policy. The court could have then analyzed intent
solely in terms of the insurance contract, rather than as a theory of
delictual liability.
Since the clause excluding coverage for intended acts was
created for reasons of policy, its application should be governed by
that underlying policy. In all likelihood, society would be benefited
by an insurance provision which expressly provides coverage for
any damages an insured might cause should he become insane. An
insane person is not likely to be discouraged from wrongdoing by
the threat of financial liability, nor to be encouraged to cause harm
by the prospect of liability coverage. The policy forbidding insurance protection for intentional harms is designed to restrict the
loss to the individual wrongdoer, thereby creating a disincentive for
45. See Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975).
46. See, e.g., Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975); Holland v. Buckley, 305
So. 2d 113 (La. 1974); Hier v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 104 Mont. 471, 67 P.2d 831
(1937). In Hier, the insured, while insane, set fire to his house and barn. The court,
upholding liability coverage under the fire insurance policy, declared that, even if the
insured had burned another's buildings, liability might be imposed "not on the ground
of negligence, as that word is usually understood, but ... on the principle that where a
loss must be borne by one of two innocent persons, it should be borne by him who occasioned it." 104 Mont. at 489, 67 P.2d at 838.
47. 308 So. 2d at 275.
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committing deliberately injurious conduct. 8 If an insured is deranged
and irrational at the time he causes harm, no such social interest is
served by refusing compensation to the victim on the ground that
the insured acted intentionally.
There is ample authority for construing the terms of a contract
against its maker in doubtful cases." It is doubtful that the clause
relied upon by the insurer was inserted in the policy in anticipation
of the insured becoming deranged and causing damage." If the insurer had planned to exclude coverage under such a circumstance, it
easily could have inserted such a proviso in its policy.' Given this
approach, it would have been possible to achieve a far narrower
holding in the instant case by finding that the character of the act
performed by the insured was not within the scope of the insurer's
exclusionary clause. It is submitted that it was unnecessary for the
court to base its holding on the broad notion that insanity may
48. "A person should suffer the financial consequences flowing from his intentional conduct and should not be reimbursed for his loss, even though he bargains for
it in the form of a contract of insurance." Isenhart v. General Cas. Co. of America, 233
Or. 49, 53, 377 P.2d 26, 28 (1962).
49. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1957 states: "In a doubtful case the agreement is interpreted against him who has contracted the obligation." In regard to the interpretation
of exclusionary clauses in insurance contracts, see Brasseaux v. Girouard, 269 So. 2d
590 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); Bezue v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., Hartford, Conn., 224
So. 2d 76 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); Wigginton v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 169 So. 2d
170 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
50.
If the death is caused by the voluntary act of the assured, he knowing and intending that his death shall be the result of his act, but when his reasoning faculties
are so far impaired that he is not able to understand the moral character, the
general nature, consequences and effects of the act he is about to commit, or
when he is impelled thereto by an insane impulse, which he has not the power to
resist, such death is not within the contemplation of the parties to the contract,
and the insurer is liable.
Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 580, 591 (1873). Where the insured is deranged
and irrational at the time he inflicted injury, "his actions cannot be regarded as 'intentional' within the meaning of an insurance contract." Rosa v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 243
F. Supp. 407, 409 (D. Conn. 1965). "In framing the exception they [the insurer] did not
have in mind nor intend to include the rare instance of the murder of the insured by
one intending the murder of another." Wildblood v. Continental Cas. Co., 182 La. 202,
206, 161 So. 584, 585 (La. 1935). "[It has come to be commonly accepted that where the
death or loss involved . . . is the product of an insane act, recovery is not barred."
Ruvolo v. American Cas. Co., 39 N.J. 490, 496, 189 A.2d 204, 207 (1963).
51. "[I1f this company did not want to assume the risk of fire loss at the hands of a
policy holder who, while insane, burned his insured buildings, it should have expressly
excepted such risk." Hier v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 104 Mont. 471, 488, 67 P.2d
831, 837 (1937).
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negate the intent requisite for delictual liability. Rather, it would
have been sufficient to determine that insanity may negate intent in
regard to insurance liability.
Ultimately, the von Dameck decision allocates the risk of
damages inflicted by an insane homeowner to the group of holders
of homeowners' insurance policies, since they must eventually bear
the cost in the form of higher premiums. While this allocation of risk
is consonant with the fundamental aim of insurance," it also serves
as a guarantee to purchasers of homeowners' insurance that their
liability coverage will not be excluded by a clause not designed to
apply to the rare case of insanity. Since the peculiar facts of this
case are not likely to be repeated, the risk placed upon insurers is
not a formidable one. The underlying reason for the decision may be
simply the court's belief that neither the insurer nor the insured
contemplate an exclusion of coverage when damage is caused by the
act of a nondiscerning person.
James F. Shuey

LOUISIANA'S PROTECTION FOR RAPE VICTIMS:

TOO MUCH OF

A GOOD THING?
In recognition of the problems faced by rape victims' who testify
as prosecution witnesses at trials in which evidence of their sexual
histories may be introduced, many states have enacted "rape shield
52. LA. R.S. 22:655 (Supp. 1962) states in part:
[All liability policies within their terms and limits are executed for the benefit of
all injured persons, his or her survivors or heirs, to whom the insured is liable;
and .. .it is the purpose of all liability policies to give protection and coverage to
all insured .. .for any legal liability said insured may have as or for a tort-feasor
within the the terms and limits of said policy.
1. For the sake of brevity, the term "victim" is used instead of "alleged victim"
as a synonym for prosecutrix or rape complainant. Simlarly, the term "rape" is used
instead of "alleged rape," and "offender" instead of "alleged offender." Such usage is
not intended to suggest that all rape complainants were in fact sexually assaulted. Nor
is the use of the term "prosecutrix" intended to imply that the "victim" is the prosecuting party in the trial, rather than the state. Finally, although emphasis herein is
placed on the problems of female complainants at rape trials, the same basic policies,
problems, and proposed solutions should apply by analogy to male rape complainants
and, where applicable, to "victims" of other sexual offenses as well. See LA. R.S.
14:41-43.1 (Supp. 1978).

